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I

Introduction

The role of the multinational corporation in development has been
subjected to one of the highest "heat to light" ratios in the literature
of any familiar to this observer.

Much connnent on the subject can only be

called polemical, emanating, on the one hand, from those who believe that
any foreign corporate presence in a developing country entails the loss
of post-colonial virginity and, on the other, from those who view such
presence as a simple augmentation of the LDCs' capacity for doing what
it wants to do in a smooth nee-classical context.

The remaining literature

usually occupies intermediate high ground by listing the pros and cons,
often as not concluding that the net weight of the argument "depends" on
the particular circumstances of the case.
It is, of course, an open question whether anyone can do better than
provide such a listing, i.e. ferret out what is generalizable about this
important and growing phenomenon, at least with respect to its economic
impact on the development process.

2

There is general agreement--if on little

else--that the nultinational corporation is relatively new, relatively
important, and that it has been growing by such leaps and bounds in the post
war that it seemed at one time to threaten to shortly gobble up virtually
all the world's GNP.

Even if that prospect is no longer threatening, the

phenomenon clearly cannot be ignored, in terms of its increasingly large
role not only in the field of foreign investment but also in international
1

The author wishes to acknowledge the very helpful conunents of Lou Goodman.

2 I hasten to add that although this conference carries "political consid
erations" as its sub-title--and although I readily acknowledge the pervasive
political economy setting within which the subject must be viewed--I find
myself, perhaps predictably for a "bourgeois economist," unable to incorporate
these dimensions to my satisfaction.
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trade.

One's perceptions of what it does or does not contribute to

development, or what it may or may not contribute in the future, are
thus not in the category of precious points for scholastic debate, but of
rather major importance for the citizenry of both the rich and the poor
countries.

There are at least two leading actors in the drama, the :MNC

(multinational corporation) and the LDCG (less developed country government);
and two supporting actors, the DCG (developed country government) and the
LOCI (less developed country industrialists).

As to the benevolence or

malevolence of the instrument from the vantage point of these various con
cerned parties, there is virtually no agreement and as yet therefore no
general political consensus as to where policies affecting the multinational
corporation should be heading.
This paper takes the basic position that the role of the multinational
corporation in development cannot be assessed independently of time and
place, but that such assessment must be related to the particular phase of
a developing country's life cycle, as well as to the type (e.g. size and
resource endowment) of the LDC in question.

Secondly, this paper emphasizes

the point that the :MNC is not by any means a monolithic organizational
concept but itself a short-hand for a heterogeneous set of organizational
forms ranging from wholly-owned subsidiaries, at one extreme, through
various kinds of joint ventures, to licensing and management contracts,
on the other.

Thus a more helpful, i.e. generalizable, interpretation of

"it depends," may be, to our mind, one which differentiates among LDCs in
terms of both historical and typological dimensions and differentiates among
various possible organizational manifestations of the :MNC.
While we are quite agnostic on whether it is, in fact, possible to
treat this phenomenon in a scientific antiseptic fashion we nevertheless

'
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feel that one has an obligation to try.

Neither resort to caricatures or

mystiques is particularly helpful in this effort.

The MNC did not just

happen--there are deep-seated reasons for its existence, persistence and
growth, as well as for the always controversial nature of its report card.
We must try to understand these reasons not in terms of some isolated,if
fascinating, phenomenon but in relation to what has been happening in the
developing world over the past quarter century of attempted transition
from colonialism to economic maturity.
The phase a particular LDC finds itself in as well as its size,
endowment, etc. will, we believe, dictate a differential analysis of the causes,
the impact, and, most importantly, the particular organizational manifesta
tion of MNC activity.

Put another way, the MNC constitutes a bundle of

activities including variable proportions of capital, technology, management,
training, entrepreneurshi p, and information.

The prominence of different

components calls for different organizational structures and consequences.
Exploration of these relationahips in a more "disaggregatedr r sense is, we
believe, likely to be more fruitful than the customary assessment of the
role of ,rthe" MNC in "the" LDC.
Section II of the paper briefly sketches in what we conceive to be the
main contours of the typical LDC transition process and relates it to the
changing motivation, organizational content, and impact of the MNC in
an idealized sense.

Section III deals with the many real world deviations

from that idealized historical path and attemps to relate such deviations
to some of the current controversy surrounding the MNC phenomenon.

Tina fi~al

section presents some modest suggestions concerning the additional light
this type of analysis may shed on future policy options facing the various
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concerned parties.

II

The Idealized Role of the :t1NC in an Historical Context
Kuznets has aptly defined the development problem as one of transition

between a long epoch of agrarian stagnation and a long epoch of modern
1
anywhe~e from 30 to 50 years
growth.
Such a transition, history tells us, may lasdand is likely
to be composed of a number of sub-phases during which the development
characteristics of the society undergo marked change.

In the pre-independence

or colonial epoch developing countries were characterized by the essentially
enclave nature of their production and trade pattern, i.e. the co-existence
of an export oriented cash crop sector and a large, relatively stagnant,
food producing agricultural hinterland.

Proceeds from this land-based

export activity were deployed to finance the consumption needs of the workers
and entrepreneurs engaged in the enclave, with the rest either reinvested in
the further expansion of the export-oriented enclave--or reinvested abroad,
as dictated mainly by the connnercial and political interests of the mother
country.

Once LDC governments had achieved political independence after

World War II--earlier in Latin America--they almost invariably attempted
to intervene in order to redirect these traditional colonial pattems of
production and trade.

This redirection is known as the import substitution

sub-phase of transition in which LDCG's aim at gaining full control of their
critical raw material

export earnings through exchange controls, and at

reallocating them towards domestic industrial and overhead expansion.

It

usually includes substantial government deficit financing accompanied by
inflation and increasingly overvalued exchange rates, quantitative import
restrictions and the rationing of other critical materials"

In fact, this

1
Modern Economic Growth, Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1966.
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regime may be characterized as still fuelled by traditional land-intensive
exports, but with both foreign exchange and domestic saving now channeled
towards the growing industrial sector and a new protected industrial
entrepreneurial class.

In this sub-phase the brute act of saving and of re

directing the flow of both new foreign and domestic investment is crucial.
It is in this period also when the fine points of appropriate technology
choice or even of appropriate output mix choice take a back seat to the
exploration of the domestic market, while entrepreneurs are given a chance
of learning-by-doing under the cover of protection, with distorted relative
prices assuring them of substantial windfall profits.
Let us now turn to the MNC in the context of such a transition from
dependent colonial to independent import substitution growth.

The old

colonial flow of investment to the overseas territories represented a type
of long-term movement of capital, management and entrepreneurship which can
be viewed as a forerunner of the MNC.
British foreign lending before 1913, for instance,was primarily
portfolio rather than direc~ with most of the investment going to the
relatively more advanced regions like the U.S. or relatively more secure
places like

u. K. rolonies.

Regions not fitting either of these categories,

e.g. Latin America, (with the exception of Argentina) received relatively
less in toto of which a relatively higher proportion apparently was in
the form of equity.

1

Thus even the form of capital flows differed depending

on the country of destination and on its overall state of economic and
entrepreneurial preparedness.

In the post-independence post-World War II

1 The above information from Brinley Thomas "The Historical Record of
International Capital Movements to 1913," as published in Capital Movements
and Economic Development: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International
Economic Association, ed. by John A. Adler with the assistance of Paul W.
Kuznets, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1967.
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era the political control which used to be associated with the colonial
type of long-run capital movement was, of course, no longer acceptable-
nor the almost exclusive concentration on raw materials and extractive
activity which characterized it.

Instead, during import substitution

investment is channeled mainly into the industrial sector of the LDC,
with the main contribution of the MNC one of adding to industrial savings,
capital accumulation and management capacity.

At this point in time,

when the market, the role of relative prices, efficiency, etc. have been
put aside, at least temporarily, in order to ensure as rapid a rate of
industrial growth as possible, foreign capital and management can provide
an important assist.

This is usually a period when technology choice

generally consists mainly in the act of turn-key borrowing from the "shelf"
of advanced country technology.

Thus the fact that the MNC is very likely

to be biased in the same direction has been no cause for special alarm.
In this period the watchword is getting the job done as quickly as possible-
with relatively little concern for efficiency--certainly not at international
prices.
Pursuing our idealized scenario, the coming of foreign capital,
either of the portfolio variety or (more likely where risks are high,
intervention difficult, and domestic managerial capacity low) in the form
of equity, can thus be expected to play an important role in this phase.
The rationale for the wholly-owned subsidiary is undoubtedly stronger at
this particular time in the history of a typical LDC than at any other.

If

the proper conditions can be established attaching to such dimensions as the
excessive use of domestic loan capital, the provision of training and up
grading of local management and labor, the avoidance of certain designated
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areas where domestic managerial and entrepreneurial capacity already exist,
plus an ex ante agreed-upon time frame for gradual disinvestment or trans
formation, the contribution of this particular form of MNC presence may
be viewed as potentially mutually beneficial.

It constitutes the

contemporary manifestation of the long term movement of international
capital and management skills in the "right" direction.

1

Help with what

the LDC needs most at this stage, i.e. a contribution to the brute act of
saving, of getting things done, of managing a relatively new type of activity,
can be provided by the wholly-owned subsidiary in this idealized setting.
We do not wish to engage here in the protracted and rather sterile
debate on the merits and demerits of the import substitution sub phase
itself.

Faithful to our historical perspective, we will simply assert that

we do believe that the infant entrepreneurial/infant industry argument has
merit at a point in time, and that much of the criticisms along the Little
Scitovsky-Scott lines

2

is properly directed towards the issues of how much,

how long and what kind of import substitution packages make sense.

3

If the

regime is sufficiently flexible, and the vested interests which typically
grow up under it not excessively strong, we would expect, after some time,
a transition towards a more open and export-oriented subphase of growth to
be effected.

We do know that this is bound to happen sooner or later

because primary or consumer goods import substitution will run out of steam,
either because the industrial sector no longer has sufficient markets
domestically to keep going and/or because the ability of the agricultural and
1
Needless to add, a logical accompaniment of such factor mobility would be
access of unskilled labor into the advanced countries.
2
Little, Scitovsky and Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries-
A Comparative Study, Oxford University Press, 1970.
3
For a fuller explanation, see the author's "Relative Prices in Planning
for Economic Development," in International Comparisons of Prices and Output,
D.J. Daly, ed., NBER, 1972, as well as the discussion with Eckstein, Ruggles
and Stolper that followed.
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cash crop export sectors to keep fuelling an often highly inefficient in
dustrialization process without any help from industrial exports becomes
ever more questionable.
It should, of course, be readily admitted that many LDCs try to per
severe with import substi tut ion, moving from the primary ( consumer goods)
to the secondary (capital goods and raw materials processing) type.

But

this becomes an ever more costly process and can be sustained in the longer
run only by countries with a reliably favorable natural resources base--and
even here problems of increasing unemployment and a worsening distribution
of income may well force a halt at some point.

This stDuggle between the

"necessities" of a changing resource endowment, socio-politica l pressures
and the reluctance of the new industrial class and the civil service to give,_
up their windfall profits and power is another,very interesting--bu t separate-story.

1

If these obstacles are successfully overcome the system is likely to
move from its land or raw material fuelled import substitution subphase to
an unskilled labor based export substitution subpha.se.

The latter is character-

ized by the capacity of the now more experienced domestic entrepreneurs to
combine with the country's abundant supply of cReap labor and begin to look
outward, away from the limited domestic market, and toward expandable export markets for labor intensive industrial goods.

The industrial

sector

can now be expected to begin to help fuel its ow:n further growth on a sus
tained basis, while the economy's entire production and trade pattern swings
closer to the lines dictated by resource endowment and efficiency considerations .
1 See, for example, Little-Scitovsk y-Scott, op. cit.; Fei and Ranis,
"Development in Open Dualistic Economies," JDS: forthcoming; as well as

Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-=su'bstit uting Industrializati on
in Latin America, 11 Vol. 82, February 1968, pp. 1-32.
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This change in the system's underlying abilities must, of course, be re
flected in accommodati ng changes in the LDCG's policy package, i.e. a gradual
move from direct controls and distorted prices towards indirect controls
and more realistic relative factor and commodity prices.

Devaluation , import

liberalizat ion, interest rate reform, the dismantling of other licensing
systems, etc. are all part and parcel of such changes in the policy package
as we have witnessed in a number--tho ugh still small--of developing countries.
While no endowment or indeed policy changes are likely to be abrupt,
what we are contemplati ng here is the gradual shift from a forced march
pattern of import substitutio n to the more flexible ballet-styl e advance of
export orientation along comparative advantage lines.

Consequentl y, in this

more efficiency oriented labor-inten sive production and growth phase the
idealized role of the MNC may also be viewed as subject to important change.
For at this point in the life cycle of an economy in transition the role of
appropriate technology and output mixes in penetrating internation al markets
becomes much more important.

One can now conceive of a benign and productive

combination between the advantages of the MNC, with its global scan of markets
and technology, and the growing domestic expertise based on the specificity
and pecularitie s of the local resource endowment and institution al factors.
In this period, the MNC presence in the organizatio nal form of joint ven
tures seems to make increasing sense.

As indigenous entrepreneu rial and

management capacities have by now gradually matured and as,with the diminution
of windfall profits,the premium on efficiency increases, there is increasing scope for a functional symbiotic association between foreign and domestic
capital as well as talent.

1

Under generally more competitive conditions

1 We, in fact, find the percentage of wholly owned multi-natio nal
projects declining by about 10% between 1939 and 1967 (U.N. Multination al
Corporation s in World Developmen t, p. 156, N.Y. 1973).
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there is an increasing need for coming up with the right amalgam of imported
and adaptive technologies and output mixes to ensure the continued outward
looking expansion of the industrial sector.
Finally, after a period of sustained export diversification, with in
dustrial sector labor absorption proceeding at a rate far ahead of population
(and labor force) growth, the LDC will ultimately approach the end of its
labor surplus condition and the beginnings of the epoch of mature growth.
One would now expect joint ventures to increasingly give way to licensing
and management contracts as the "final" manifestation of the MHC presence
in the interplay among advanced countries--along with the movement of port
folio capital in response to international differences in the rate of return.
We would expect such interactions to be a continuing, flexible feature of
the international movement of capital, accompanying a global division of
labor with respect to both final and intermediate products.
If we accept, even in rough outline,_ this idealized, if undoubtedly
somewhat naive, two-track picture of the gradual phasing of growth regimes
within the developing country, along with the gradual pahsing of what con
stitutes the optimal expression of an MNC presence, the outlines of a changing
mutually beneficial relationship can be discerned.

There is a gradual shift

of emphasis from the pure generation of saving and getting the management job
done to one of efficiency and entrepreneurial flexibility; from the simple
transfer of technology and tastes perfected in different contexts, to the
search for imaginative indigenous technology and output mixes;

from the simple

capital-intensive add-on to the import substitution enclave,to the labor
intensive partnership with substantial

spill-over effects.

In all these efforts the additional possibility presented by a foreign
MNC presence is, of course, just that, i.e. an additional potential advantage
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if the above idealized script is not entirely discarded.

The real world,

we all know, is likely to be many steps removed from such an ideal.

The

basic suggestion of this paper, therefore, is not to claim that "all is
for the best in this best of all possible worlds," but to indicate -- by
contrasting the real world with such an ideal--that much of the pervasive
misunderstandin g on the role of the MNC in development may be related to the
fact that some or all of the major parties involved too often choose to
ignore the historical context and thus the changing nature of any potential
mutually beneficial interdependence between the MNC and the LDC.

If, for

one reason or another, one party or another, attempts--as they do--to move
against these underlying realities, e.g. to rearrange the sequence, or to
prevent the sequence from playing itself out, global welfare benefits decline
a?)d frictions as to their distribution rise.

We intend to illustrate this

point and to pursue the resultant inevitable generation of substantial con
flicts in the next section.
III

Departures from the Evolutionary Ideal
If we read the record of the past quarter of a century correctly, there

exist substantial real world obstacles to any such idealized or "normal"
phasing of a changing relationship between the LDC and MNC.

On the side of

the MNCs there has been a clear reluctance to move from the wholly-owned
subsidiary to the joint venture, licensing, etc. as host LDC entrepreneuria l
capacity matures and pure saving assumes a lesser importance.

On the part

of the LDCG's there is often a desire to retain import substitution controls
long after their rationale has lost its force but, as the MNC mystique de
clines, large MNC profits are noted, and nationalistic resentments increase,
to attempt to turn the temperature down only for the foreign investor.

This

-12-

is likely to be due to a mutual misunde rstandin g of the predicta ble dynamics
of the relation ship over time.

The bargains struck initiall y during early

import substitu tion are almost bound to guarante e the MNC an extreme ly high
rate of return, based in substan tial part on the public grant of monopoly
power, which it is later understa ndably loathe to surrend er.

The LDC for

its part, often wants the MNC presence at that point for reasons of prestige ,
bandwagon effects or security , almost regardle ss of the terms--a nd often at
terms much in excess of what it would take to attract it.

Witness not only

the protecti on and market-p ower granted through licensin g and other controls
but also the lavish tax holiday and other fiscal favors customa rilly bestowed .
Moreove r, regardle ss of one's judgmen t about the relative benefits accruing
to the two parties as a result of a particu lar foreign investm ent at this
point in time, there should be general agreeme nt that the advantag es to the
recipien t LDC will decline over time and those to the investin g MNC increase
over time--in the absence of any change in the nature of the contrac t.
An example of the reversa l of the natural sequence which is sometim es

attempte d is for the MNC to view the joint venture not as a (later) instru
ment for acconnno dating to the growing local entrepre neurial, management and
research expertis e but to utilize it (earlier ) to try to circumv ent LDCG
controls increasi ngly aimed-- in response to growing domestic pressur es--at
foreign capital, as import substitu tion proceed s.

Such tendenc ies are more

likely if the product line is fairly broad and diversi fied, tradanar ks
and patents can be used to gain control over the domestic market:, and there
is relative ly little risk of loss of "real," i.e. appropr iable, technolo gy
via local partner s--- or of disagree ment with them on transfer pricing or other
non-com petitive practice s. Similar ly, with respect to the relative importan ce
over time of research , de \elopmen t and enginee ring, we oftm see an attempt
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to support research, often very basic, during import substitution within
both the public and private sectors of the LDC--almost invariably leading
to a substantial wastage of resources--instead of de-emphasizing such ac
tivity until much later--and even then, placing more faith in engineering
improvements emerging at the factory floor and repair sh6p level rather
than the large b1•eakthroughs of the corporate lab variety.

We know that

the licensing of technical processes is often used by the MNC, e.g. in
India,

1

as a device not really to transfer technology among relatively co

equal partners but to gain certain market-sharing advantages or evade the
exchange controls and, by the cooperating domestic firm, to be able to enlist
the help of the foreigners in convincing the "controls bureaucracy" to issue
certain vital slips of paper.

The entire arena of so-called technology

transfer is thus often misused by both parties--one party claiming that it
is transferring knowledge when it is, in fact, only utilizing such devices
to gain or maintain a monopoly or trademark advantage; the other, claiming
it is receiving knowledge when, in fact, it requires the mystique of the MNC
hook-up to consolidate its own hold within the import substitution hothouse.
Thus we encounter certain code words and payments for services other than
those stipulated, with the main loser the LDC consumer and the development
objective generally.

Patents, licensing and technical collaboration agree

ments "before their time," i.e. before there can be some reasonable equality
in the technological partnership and some services for the payments rendered,

1 V.N. Balasubramanyam, International Transfer of Technology to India,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
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1
have given rise to considerable controversy.
the
Even with respect to/transfer of capital, pure and simple, this reversal

of the idealized sequence is frequently encountered.

During import substitution

when domestic interest rates are usually kept artificially low (part of the
effort aimed at favoring local industry) it is the MNC which gets favored
treatment when local capital is rationed.

Thus the wholly owned subsidary

may be more than 50% financed by subsidized local capital with only 25%
representing new equity flows.

During the more competitive, export oriented

sub-phase, in contrast, when the contribution to brute saving is less crucial,
higher interest rates within the LDC may induce the MNC to bring in a
relatively larger share of new investment capital from the outside.
We may thus observe a marked lack of sensitivity on the part of the
MNC to the changing capacities and needs of the LDC as it attempts its transi
tion to modern growth through various historical subphases, and an equal lack
of sensitivity on the part of the LDC as to how it can really maximize the
benefits and minimize the costs of this foreign presence at different points
in its life cycle.

In fact, all the actors are likely to be guilty of causing

major departures from the ideal.
"deviant" behavior.

There are good underlying reasons for such

First, the MNC, whose profits are initially based mainly

on market imperfections, may find itself naturally unwilling to voluntarily

1 See Vaitsos, for example ("Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing
C01.mtries," Journal of Development Studies, October, 1972) who concluded that
"in the real world of multiple patent ownership by large corporations, the
main functions of patents is not to encourage inventive activity but to aid
profit maximization through minimization of competitive forces." Premature
patenting is often simply a prelude to the acquisition of local firms.
Machlup t "Patents," International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. II)
believes that mainly DCG pressures and mistaken prestige motives account for
LDC membership in the international patent convention.
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shift from windfall to earned profits as required by the nature of the phasing.
Second, the LDCG which often "blows hot and cold" with respect to its reg
ulatory attitude on foreign enterprise, may refuse to try to differentia te
among the various organizatio nal manifestatio ns of the MNC in any consistent
fashion--an d end up either welcoming all parts of the MNC bundle or rejecting
all.

(It may thus be obtaining the worst of both worlds, in extension of

the well-known shibboleth that a consistent, if tough, policy vis-a-vis
the MNC would be much preferred by foreign investors to one that is better
"on average" but fluctuating and unpredictab le).

Third, the private LDCI

who i.nitially almost unthinkingl y welcomes the presence of large foreign
companies to help him "test the waters" and provide political support for
government policies favoring the industrial class, often later turns on the
MNC when he finds himself unable to compete effectively with foreigners who
have favored access to capital markets, bureaucrats , etc.

Fourth, DCG's

seeking to support the actions of their own investors abroad--whi ch they
claim are also in the interest of the LDC's--ofte n do so without any perception
of changes in the landscape and the consequent need for change in the nature
of the potentially symbiotic relationshi p•
of

"right or wrong, this is my MNC".

Often the policy approaches that

Aid is tied to the host country treat

ment of MNCs in the form of Hickenloope r and Gonzales amendments; and man
ifestations of modern extra-terri toriality extend as far as the application
of antitrust and Trading with the Enemy Acts to U.S. subsidiarie s abroad
(as in the celebrated recent case of Argentine motor sales to Cuba).
Little wonder that we sense the current rising tide of

dissatisfac tion

and friction.bu t have thus far had little success in disentangli ng the meaning
of "symbiotic coexistence " in this particular sphere of global interdepend ence.
Blame is placed by any one of the actors or the other without any real
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consideration of the meaning and substance of any ideal (or at least "better")
relationship at any particular point in time, or of what elements of flex
ibility could be built in as a safeguard for the (inevitable) change in the
underlving conditions.

The all-too-frequent interventions by all parties

in any such idealized phasing which may be postulated can be placed at the
doorstep either of a basic misreading of history, or a basic misunderstanding
of the requirements of long term coexistence, or--if one prefers-- a
malevolent conspiracy among colluding vested interest groups who, laboring
under a short time horizon, are endeavoring to "get rich quick" by defrauding the LDC public.

While it is always most difficult to determine motivation,

we shall assume here--for the sake of argument--that the LDCGs taken as a
whole are well intentioned and desirous of striking the best bargain for
their societies and that most MNCs are not interested in a hit and run
strategy but rather in realizing long term profit goals.

If they don't

succeed, it is not because we accept the inevitability of conflict under
an idealized phasing on both sides, but because there is misunderstanding
and miscalculation.

In order to give this (admittedly vulnerable) argument

a little more concreteness,let us look at a couple of points of controversy
to see if they can be related to interventions with what we have called the
ideal phasing of the relationship.
The role of the MNC in providing scarce capital is one.

Those who

accept the straight nee-classical line would argue that the MNC is basically
an example of a long-run capital movement from capital rich to capital poor
regions and don't understand why there should be any question in terms of
both global welfare enchancement and benefits to the host LDC.

On the other

hand, we have seen that MNCs often actually don't bring in very much capital,
i.e. only 25% of the investment is in the form of foreign equity, with 50%
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or more made up of loans obtained at favored rates in the local money markets.
In the early import substitutio n phase,when savings are still the most scarce
item, a wholly owned subsidiary should, therefore, be asked to bring in
most of its capital from abroad, either in loan or, more likely, equity form.
But or..ce the particular domestic shortage which can be alleviated through
the MNC presence shifts from capital towards ent??epreneu rship and information
(especially in the realm of intermediat e goods markets and global technology
scanning capacity), the LDCG's concern should shift accordingly .
Second there is the much repeated, and undoubtedly correct, accusation
that the MNC, especially in its wholly owned subsidiary manifestati on, has
unprecedent ed power, unchallenge d by either the LDCG or DCG, to show its
profits where it pleases by allocating its overhead, setting transfer prices,
moving currencies about, etc.

On the other hand, many of these so-called

abuses, serious as they may be, spring from the environment created by the
LDCG in its desire to avoid foreign competition , and provide special access to
credit, investment guarantees, tax advantages and "the quiet life" for its
industrial entrepreneu rs generally.

Whether or not LDC governments create

such hot house environmen ts, attract MNCs and then blame them for continuing to
prosper in the shape

of the increasingly disliked subsidiary- -even after

the logic has passed--or whether the MNC influences the LDCG both to adopt
these policies initially and then to refuse to turn down the temperature
later may not really be the important question.
is correct and the result is the same:

Undoubtedly some of both

an interventio n in the capacity for

a natural transition from import to export substitutio n on the part of the
LDCG and in the pattern of transition from a wholly-owne d subsidiary to the
more flexible joint venture, licensing and management contract manifestati ons
of the MNC.
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A closer look at the area of technology transfer and technology choice
may serve to illustrate the point further.

Let us differentiate, at the

outset, between the various components of what normally goes under the name
of "technology."

There is, first of all, existing knowledge about different

processes or different ways of producing a given commodity in different en
dowment situations--and ways and means of devising new ones.
the economist usually has in mind.)

(This is what

Second, there is existing knowledge

about different types and qualities of goods--and ways and means of devising
new ones (this is what the businessman usually has in mind).

Finally there

is the distinction to be drawn between the "actual" transfer of technology-
of either kind--frorn rich to poor countries, and the "fictitious" transfer,
e.g. via patents, trademarks and the like, as a device to preserve oligopoly
power and/or avoid exchange controls.

To put it quite bluntly, much of the

discourse on the role of the MNC in technology transfer has been thoroughly
confusing because these very different dimensions have not been analyzed
separately and, most important from the point of view of this paper, report
cards have been issued on the basis of only a very partial review of the per
formance and without regard to the historical context.
Specifically, MNCs are, for example, often taken to task for selling
overpriced patented "know-how" to their subsidiaries or licensees, the main
purpose of the transaction being to restrict entry to both domestic or other
MNC competition, while increasing the domestic demand for "overspecified"
or luxury goods (soft drinks and toothpaste are frequent examples).

There

undoubtedly is a tendency for MNCs to be less active in this regard when the
"technology" transferred is less appropriable, e.g. focussed on techniques
as opposed to quality variation.

Yet does that mean that the famous Veblenite

"advantage of the late-corner" in borrowing from the international shelf of
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technology is but a fairy tale--possibly commissioned in some corporate
board room in New York or London?
We really do not think so; these advantages are real but often eclipsed
by even larger advantages based on other-than technology characteristics .
As long as the LDC finds itself in the heavily monopolistic era of import
substitution growth

it will try to transfer "technology" of the Pepsodent

(or product differentiation ) type when what the LDC really needs is capital
and management.

It will try to obtain a thorough-going emulation of the

international (previously imported) good (e.g. Coca Cola and drip-dry shirts)
when adaptive goods (e.g. Green Spot and bush shirts) would serve better,
i.e. prove cheaper while producing the same amount of consumer utility.

Later

on, once a more competitive and export oriented environment obtains, the LDCG
should realistically welcome the inflow of information and technique and
product oriented technology change to ensure the successful
participation of her industrial sector in world markets.

and sustained

In fact, it often

does not try to draw this distinction and hardens its attitude--on the basis
of its now greater entrepreneurial confidence and/or stronger nationalistic
attitudes--jus t at the time when it could derive larger benefits.

The :MNC,

for its part, as has been shown by the experience of Japan, will not neces
sarily "cut and run" when forced to concentrate on "real" technology trans
fers, but will instead accept lower (earned) levels of profit in place of
higher (unearned) levels of monopoly rents.

But it is also, and quite

understandably , perfectly willing to continue playing the import substitution
game, even if now directed, (via export subsidies, tax concessions and the
like) towards the more favored export markets.

One need only remind the

reader that negative value added can be as negative when contributed in pro
duction for export (and by foreigne~s) as in import substitution.
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The product cycle presumes to tell us something about the changing
motivations of the MNC as it first explores its own domestic DC markets,
then exports, then moves defensively to produce abroad, and, finally, seeks
to export from its LDC base.

While there exists no necessary synchroniza

tion between this sequence for any particular product line and the natural
evolution of the resource endowment, the policy package in any given LDC,
or the particular organizational manifestation of the MNC, we would expect
to find relatively more of the wholly-owned subsidiary type of MNC in India
and relatively-more joint ventures and licensing ~rangements in Taiwan.
This assumes that the admittedly substantial departures from the evolutionary
ideal are distributed more or less equitably across countries.

In this way

our view can be subjected to some rough and ready tests not only longitudinally,
i.e. by eMamining post-war LDCs

in transition,or the longer historical ex

perience of Japan, but also cross-sectionally, i.e. by contrasting contemporary
LCDs in different phases of development.
We have not attempted any such tests in the context of this paper-
which is intend~d only as suggestive of possible new directions of analysis.
Nevertheless, in addition to the somewhat loose and episodal discussion con
cerning the contemporary LDCs, a word on the Japanese historical case
which does not, at first blush, seem to fit the case terribly well, may be
in order.

Japan, it should be emphasized, experienced a relatively unique

early transition period.

On the one hand, it was relatively neglected,even

after the Seclusion period ended, by foreign colonial powers who were busily
occupied elsewhere; on the other, the unequal treaty provisions of the Meiji
period forced Japan into a relatively mild (i.e. low protection)version of
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the import substitution sub-phase.

This meant the virtual absence of the

colonial type of investment in overheads while in industry proper subsidies and
extensive technical assistance to domestic investors or direct government
ownership replace<l the creation of a heavily protected hot-house beckoning
to foreign as well as domestic enterprise.

Nevertheless the wholly-owned

subsidiary form of foreign investment was used in an era where Japanese
experience and entrepreneurial capacity was as yet deemed insufficient, e.g.,
in international trade, banking and shipping lIDtil the turn of the century.
The predominance of foreign firms in these areas was reduced after 1900 when a
more outward or trade-oriented policy coincided with greater interest on
the partof foreign companies in joint ventures (then called "joint companies")
with the increasingly formidable Zaibatsu groups, in such industries as
electrical engineering, rubber products, metals and linoleum, culminating in
a substantial expansion during the 20's and 30 1 s.

As we would expect, technical

assistance, patent and licensing arrangements became more prominent thereafter.
Thus the Japanese case may be said to represent a "mild" version of the
idealized sequence with both the sub-phases of transition and the changes in the
MNC presence muted by the twin forces of early (and consistent) Japanese
government resistance and early lack of interest on the part of the Western world.
The way in which technological change is itself generated is subject
to a similar and, of course, related cycle.

If we distinguish not only between

R&D (research and development) but add also E (engineering) and I (information),
we can perhaps arrive at some general statements about what constitutes

1 see also G. C. Allen and A. G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far
Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan (London, 1962), and Edwin P.
Reubens, "Foreign Capital and Domestic Development in Japan," in S. Kuznets,
ed., Economic Growth: Brazil, India and Japan, (Duke University Press, 1955),
pp. 179-228.

1

-22-

Basic R&D would presumably

an ideal sequence in a particular product area.

be carried on at the outset in the home labs of the MNC, i.e., during the
LDCs' import substitution sub-phase, with scarcely any technology-rela ted
activity taking place abroad.

l

Facing a relatively low volume LDC domestic

market, the main objective of the MNC would be to gain assured access with
the help of transplanted turn-key technology, restricted model choice (and
as little foreign capital input as possible).

During this phase MNC sub

sidiaries very often even carry outright prohibitions against exports to
reassure rivals on market share stability.

Once the host coillltry's infra

structure and entrepreneurial capacity has progressed to permit a move toward
substantial industrial export orientation the MNC can be seen to take an
increasing'inte rest in the possibility of new product design specifications
and the use of a more labor intensive technology.

As the MNC's profit source

abroad is forced to shift from production and sale in the home market to
export sales, expenditures on· R&D and E become important for the first time.
Conventional corporate lab R & D may, however, still have a much lower value
than the small modifications in technology and product design which are more
likely to emanate from the machine shops and assembly lines of the LDC plant.
The accumulating evidence indicates

2

that most of these consist of labor

using adaptations peripheral to the machine or core process proper, including
mainly handling, packaging, storing, etc.

But there are also examples of

machine speed-ups supplemented by greater (manual) quality control and more

Globally, more than 95% of MNC "official" R&D expenditures are made
1
at home.
See H. Pack, "Employment and Productivity in Kenyan Manufacturing, "
2
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, February 1974; G. Ranis, "Industrial
Sector Labor Absorption," Economic Development and Cultural Change, March
1973; and W. P. Strassman, Technological Change and Economic Development,
Cornell University Press, 1968.
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intensive machine maintenance, and the upgrading of a lower quality raw
material into a standard quality intermediate product (e.g., in cotton yarn
and plywood production) via the application of ''more labor."

In addition,

the willjngness to sacrifice minute gradations in quality, e.g. yarn counts,
can often yield large benefits in additional factor substitution potential.
Such non-spectacular but nevertheless highly important rearrangements of
the production line (adaptive technology) or non-spectacular adjustments in
quality (adaptive goods) are the consequence largely of plant engineering
changes (E) rather than R4D--though "adaptive research" emanating from the
workshops is just as appropriate a label.

Interview-based episodal evidence

indicates that it often takes considerable time and energy to persuade the
mother company that such modifications are possible without unintended
sacrifice of the sacred cow of an internationally advertised product quality.
At the end of the sequence running from E to adaptive R&D (opposite from
the DC sequence), i.e. once the LDC is well into its export oriented develop
ment phase, the case for supporting overseas R&D becomes stronger.

Leaving

aside such arguments as the attraction of lower legal control standards on
research (e.g. in pharmaceuticals~ we are focussing only on the enhanced
possibility for a mutually advantageous real content inter-penetration of
know-how among now relatively more equal partners tied together via a nexus
of cross-licensing and patents.

That this world does not often exist in

DC-LDC relations--it does within Western Europe, between Europe and the U.S.,
and, to some extent, between the U.S. and Japan--does not alter its in
creasing realism as we look to the future.
It is interesting to note that even LDCs still deeply ensconced in their
import substitution sub-phase (as most are) may open up a selected portion of
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their industrial sectors to export substitution--via the so-called export
processing zone device.

Here MNCs working with subsidiaries or local

partners abroad often begin by placing assembly operations abroad in special
zones out of the reach of LDC tariff and other controls.

Raw materials are

imported from abroad, value added is mainly labor, and the product is re
exported.

This device, along with such provisions as (in the case of the

U.S.) Sections 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Code, which permit

re-entry

duties to be levied on only the value added abroad, enables the MNC to take
advantage of the LDC's cheap unskilled labor supplies.

The growing phenomenon

of international subcontracting by process, e.g. in electronics, textiles,
leather goods, gloves, etc., has been growing by leaps and bounds over the
past decade.
LDCs.

It now constitutes more than 1/6 of total U.S. imports from

But what is even more to the point is that what initially starts as

a simple process of taking advantage of cheaper labor abroad usually becomes,
after some time, a source of labor-using technology change.

Once the log-jam

on the preservation of quality standards is broken, additional LDC processing
levels, forward and backward from the initial emphasis on assembly, are likely
to be added.

One rather convincing demonstration of the contrast of the role

of E, D, and R (in that order) between a more competitive export-oriented
and a less competitive domestic-oriented industrial environment is provided
by comparing technologies in use in the same industry in the same country at
the same time.

To cite but one example, MNC brassiere manufacturers in the

Mexican border industries produce much more labor intensively than those
serving the still protected domestic market.

Once forced to abandon the

"quiet life" of windfall profits and satisficing entrepreneurial behavior,
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MNCs--like their local counterpart s--will "scratch around" to find techno
logical alternative s; they could eventually- -e.g. in the Mexican case cited,
if given permission- -"export" competitive ly into their own domestic market
and thus reverse the normal Linder sequence of internation al trade. 1
The rejection of export processing zones by sane labor supplus LDCs
and their generally bad press, even where they have been booming along
successfull y, is somewhat puzzling and presents another example of inter
ventions in our natural sequence, i.e. the beginnings of export orientation
patterns in a, generally still protectioni st system.

Surely these are

enclaves with relatively small technologic al spill-over effects, but just
as surely they are not exploiting irreplaceab le natural resources, but
"exploiting " or, rather absorbing, otherwise unemployed and thus forever
"wasted" human resources.
As the LDC nears economic maturity, access to information (I) is exposed
as an increasingl y important source of MNC profits as other components of MNC
superiority fall away.

Especially in the particularl y imperfect markets for

intermediat e goods and in the global search for appropriate technology the
common assumption of freely available information is most suspect--ev en in
the later more competitive phase of development .

Thus a nattll"al evolution

sees the MNC initially with little interest in transferrin g technology to
the LDC, then moving to the encourageme nt of E, finally R&D--revers ing its
normal behavior in the DC sequence.

1

S. Burenstam Linder,

1961.

The joint venture, LDC licensee or

An Essay on Trade and Transformat ion, Uppsala,

-26-

independent producer will then become increasingly concerned with I,
access to information on both technology and design alternatives and markets.
Imitation or adaptation elsewhere of the Japanese trading company organiza
tional form--which permits access to an essentially highly imperfect international market by smaller independent domestic producers, 1 could help assure
a better distribution of the profits--with due regard to only the legitimate
functions of effectively utilized patents, licenses, etc.

It could also permit

greater scope for joint ventures between smaller MN Cs and these smaller
domes.tic firms.

Where "real" economies of scale are exaggerated and dwarfed

by artificial economies of larger size (and market power) such combinations
are likely to be very effective, especially in penetrating foreign markets.

IV

Policy Options

Where then does this idealized evolutionary view of the potential for
productive coexistence-~plus a description of the very substantial real world
deviations from it--lead us with respect to the future?

While one is hesi

tant to make any predictions, it can be asserted with some confidence that
the reality is becoming uglier and that LDCs and MNCs currently find them
selves on something of a collision path as the result of the cumulative
effects of too many "interventions" by all the parties.

There seems to be a

general tendency towards confrontation in the relations between the rich and
the poor in areas which matter to the rich (as on critical rew materials) and
towards not-so-benign neglect where they don't (as on foreign aid).

Neo

colonial fears currently fuelling a new populism in many LDCs are, mo~over,
I

1

Now also being attempted in Brazil.
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interacting with a defensive economic nationalism in a developed world
perplexed by its own current plethora of seemingly insoluble problems.
The spiral seems to point downward and could well lead to autarky (and anarchy)
in international economic relations.
On the other hand, we also perceive an opportunity in the midst of the
current upheaval.

With so many moorings loose and so many once comfortable

assumptions under reexamination it is reasonable to believe that this is also
a good time for a reexamination of the potential developmental role of the
MNC.

This is. likely to be true whether or not our own notions concerning

the anatomy of an ideal and dynamically changing relationship among the four
main actors are accepted.

Since we are necessarily somewhat partial to what

has gone before, however, we shall, in this section, attempt to derive some
conclusions for policy based on our own analysis of the issues.
First and foremost, we would argue for an unbundling of the MNC into
its component parts and a much more explicit examination as to just what is
being transferred and what is being paid for and at what ~ate at each stage
of the development process. 1

Most misunderstandings arise because of the

mystique of the powerful, footloose MNC, bargaining with the poor, option-less
LDCG, the latter thus being pressured to buy what is essentially a "pig in
a poke."

The capital, technology, management and entrepreneurship components

of any deal should be spelled out as fully as possible and each component
priced out.

Screening procedures which exist in virtually every LDC, espe

cially during the import substitution sub-phase, should concentrate more on
disaggregation and full disclosure, thus permitting comparative shopping and

1
See also Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "North-South Relations: The Economic
Component," Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 200, April 1974.
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other than all-or-nothing acceptances or rejections.

Fade-out and divestiture

agreements can similarly be negotiated much more intelligently ab initio in
the light of some historical perspective which might provide, for example,
for a transition from the wholly owned subsidiary to the joint venture form
after 10 years, and possibly further reassessments in the direction of licensing
or management contracts thereafter.
We must, of course, contend with the argument that "it is unlikely that
multi-national firms will ever be willing to repeat the Japanese experience
elsewhere because, from their point of view, they helped create formidable
cornpetition to themselves for very meager returns. 111
more at every stage they will seek more.

Cl.early, if offered

But if there is a clea:r and anti

cipated transition from one function (and one bundle) to another within a
particular LDC, competitive pressures among the MNCs should assert themselves
to dictate a willingness to accept reasonable rates of return.

In this we

would be safer in relying on the MNCs' long-ron profit objectives rather than
on some public spirited impulse.

2

Negotiations should recognize that it is

mutually better to plan on living together under changing rules than to attempt
to aeny the declining value of some major MNC components over time and thus
inviting expropriation or other retaliatory action.

The burden of proof would

have to be on the side of those, e.g., Vernon, who claim to see, as indeed
may sometimes be the case, a general tendency for a broadening and deepening
relative role for the MNC over time.

1

Larry Krause, "The International Economic System and the Multi-national
Corporation," Annals of the American Academy of Political And Social Science,
September 1972, p. 99.
2

As Heney Ford II put it recently: "A corporation can serve society only
if it is profitable. And it can stay profitable only if it is responsive to
the [changing] needs ••.• of the society in which it operates." (material in
brackets and underlining added)
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LDCG screening procedures governing MNC presence should thus be modified
in the direction of greater automaticity, greater predictability and more
built-in flexibility over time.

Such procedures should reflect a recognition

that some of the excesses of the MNC, ranging from transfer pricing to the
payment of unduly high wages, to the inappropriateness of the technology
selected, to the underutilization of patents and the overutilization of
domestic credit and export prohibition clauses, are not unrelated to the
policy environment created by the LDCGs for all industry.

The MNC can be

most effectively forced to put its energies into building better mousetraps,
and using adaptive (labor intensive) technologies in doing so, if it is forced
to give

up the "quiet life" of the satisficing monopolist as the transition

to a more liberal policy regime is effected.

MNCs are quite capable of coming

up with approp~iate technology and output ideas when there are pressures to
"scratch around" further, witness the above cited experience in the export
processing zones and the labor intensive multi-purpose Ford and GM vehicles,
using simple sheet metal, jigs and fixtures, currently being produced in
1
South-East Asia.
Some of the windfall profits created through protection, subsidization, etc. are necessary to compensate entrepreneurs for tmdue risks during
early import substitution.

Even "old" MNC subsidiaries have learning and

institutional problems to overcome.

There are advantages, however, even then,

in working for some harmoni3ation among neighboring LDCs to avoid being played
off one against the other, on the one hand, and granting concessions far in
excess of what is required to effect the move, on the other.

Moreover, where

1
As a Ford executive put it (William o. Boltt'ke, "Basic Vehicle for South
East Asia," in Technology and Economics in International Development, AID
Seminar, May, 1972, p. 75) "simplicity is often harder to achieve than sophis---,
The adaptive,
,1 tj,.s::~t_io~'-':::_-:-b!:J."t J.t c~_}?~ achieved when the motive is there.
complementati~::/
so-called
the
from
distinguished
be
/'I. :Qabor intensive) case should
programs, i.e. to produce a conventional vehicle by siting different processes
in different countries, which has been less successfulo
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the major "advantag e" of the MNC is trademark recognitio n in a low technolog y
area, with domestic producers threatene d by displacem ent and domestic con
sumers by demonstra tion effects, screening procedure s should restrict entry.
Removal

of the veil of secrecy and full disclosur e requireme nts thereafte r

would constitut e a giant step in the direction of avoiding unnecessa ry fric
tions.

Much of the present problem is one of perceptio n and mutual suspicion

causing secular love/hate rather than arm's length relations hips.
There is much that can and should also·be done by the DCG's individua lly
and collectiv ely to facilitat e the evolution of a natural and mutually bene
ficial sequence.

Most important perhaps is a sustained effort to move away

from the image of a knee-jerk DC reaction in favor of its MNC citizens abroad-
right or wrong.

Hickenloo per and Gonzales amendments are viewed as only

slightly modernize d versions of gunboat diplomacy , and are equally ineffecti ve.
The U.S. has made no major effort in recent years to get rid of these and
other well encrusted barnacles on the vintage 1961 aid legislatio n.

The

extension of domestic anti-trus t and Trading With the Enemy legislatio n and
other forms of extra-ter ritorialit y to U.S. MNCs abroad represent s, in
general, an ineffecti ve and highly offensive instrumen t.

Similarly the

administr ative practice of public sector aid tying sets an unfortuna te
example for intra-MNC movements of capital, both adversely affecting the LDC's
choice of technolog y.
Closely related is the issue of OPIC-type governmen t investmen t guaran
tees.

There would seem to be little reason to provide MNCs quasi-aut omaticall y

with DCG-subs idized specific or extended risk guarantee s on the basis of
financial criteria only.

Any MNC investmen t thus guarantee d by the DCG

carries with it the implied blessing of the rich country; it is incumbent
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on the DCG to reassure itself that no unfair trade practices, exclusive
market demands, export prohibition clauses or other objectionable procedures
are being contemplated before any guaranty is extended.
Finally, DCG 's should be ready to support LDC efforts to move out of
import substitution and into export-oriented growth phases.

The most

important contribution here is by not slamming the door (via higher tariffs,
quotas and threatened quotas) in the face of the successful LDC's.

More "aid"

spent at home, i.e. in the DC's'domestic markets in the form of effective
adjustment assistance, would be of great help for any sustained export oriented
strategy by a substantial number of transitioning LDCs.

Moreover, it is

often substantially easier to overcome both vested interests and honest doubts
concerning an impending import liberalization within the LDC, if tempor-ary
aid ballooning is possible to "protect" exchange reserves and public revenues
during the transition.

On the technical assistance side, donors should

generally view with favor LDCG efforts to beef up their own legal and economic
staffs in order to deal more effectively--an d on a more equal footing--with
their large and powerful MNC counterparts.

International assistance with

research on adaptive industrial technology (see the analogies to rice and
wheat research),as well as in providing greater access to markets and informa
tion to all parties (large and small firms, domestic and MNC' s) on an equitable
basis, would also be of considerable help.
Internationally , the intended and actual application of the Paris Con
vention on Patents certainly needs to be reviewed if wholesale LDC defections
are to be avoided.

Whether a fair conduct code governing MNC-LDCG relations

along the lines of the recent Kindleberger proposal will do much good at this
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particular point in time is questionable;

1 but it is also clear that unless

we move in such a direction as a longer term goal, Krause's analogy

2

between

.the MNC internationally and its domestic counterpart within an expanding
United States common market will continue to limp rather badly.
The world thus still finds itself a long way from George Ball's cosmo
corp or Harry Johnson's uni-globe.

In fact, there are some current danger

signals that, at least in the short term, we may be moving in precisely the
opposite direction, that of increasingly autarkic warring parties both as
between the rich and the poor and as between Europe and the U.S. and even as
between the least developed and the less developed countries.
Yet, we believe there is reason for hope.

For one, the real interde.

pendence of "spaceship earth," long a part of establishment rhetoric, is
being recognized as never before in the wake of the oil crisis; and even
though the lesson has been an expensive one, there is increasing realization
of the need for an approach to symmetry in international economic relations
if future breakdowns are to be avoided.

In this context greater understanding

of the differential contribution the MNC can make to development in different
phases of the growth process can help, both in curbing the excessive appetite
for quick profits arid the excessive annoyance with red tape on the part of
corporate managers, and the excessive fear, on the part of the LDCs,of corporate

1

see P. Goldberg and C. P. Kindleberger, "Toward a GATT for Investment:
A Proposal for the Supervision of the International Corporation," in Law and
Policies in International Business, Summer 1970, as well as the Code of Conduct
referred to in the recent report by UN/ECOSOC on "The Impact of Multinational
Corporations on the Development Process and, on International Relations" (also
known as the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons).
2

Op. cit.
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excesses or big power, nee-colonial machinations.

The best basis for

harnessing the additional resources and talents that are there, it seems
to us, is full knowledge of what is and what is not in any particular MNC
btmdle and what is and what is nd: helpful--and at what price--at each stage
of the development process.

We are not at all sure that our attempt to un

bundle, disaggregate and insert a time dimension has gotten to the heart of
the matter--there are psychological and political dimensions which are
cle~rly left to one side--;but we do believe that we have to search in this
general direction if the global maximization principles of economic inter
dependence are to be reconcilable with differing distributional claims in
an· imperfectly competitive real world.

